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Abstract
Radio has long served as an important source of information and means of
communication in Tibet. I discuss the history of wireless communication and
broadcasting as it developed in the years before the 1950 invasion and summarize the
dismantling of the Tibetan’s communication network after the 17 Point Agreement.
Next, foreign broadcasting aimed at Tibetans living in China is discussed. American
broadcasting is overseen by the Broadcasting Board of Governors. Radio Free Asia and
Voice of America carry out broadcasting directed at Tibetans. U.S. government funded
broadcasting is particularly controversial; I compare a number of viewpoints on the
subject. Voice of Tibet was founded in Norway and focuses only on Tibetan issues in
lieu of world news. Finally, I address the question of the efficacy and ethicality of
foreign programming in China.
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Introduction
A discussion of Tibetan history often points to Tibet’s tendency towards isolation.
This tendency is no accident: the terrain of Tibet is often inhospitable and travel through
Tibet is not easy. Considering its countryside, wireless communications were and are an
important means of communication. From the early days, radio was used for commercial
and strategic purposes. Today, radio communications serve to inject new ideas and
create an arena for critical thinking in a country with decidedly single-minded state
media. These efforts are appreciated by some and questioned by others. Radio directed
at Tibetans reflects the evolution of the Tibetan situation: although at first isolated with
little experience in international relations, currently Tibetans as a whole find themselves
in the middle of a tug-of-war between western and Chinese ideologies.

1. Robert Ford
The story of Tibetan radio can be said to begin with Robert Ford. As a sergeant
instructor at an R.A.F. Radio School in Hyderabad in 1945, he had heard vague tales of
Tibet’s God-King, the Dalai Lama, and a kingdom in the sky. According to his
autobiography, Captured in Tibet, he volunteered at a temporary posting in Lhasa in
order to escape a quotidian life of nine-to-five-dom. Ford’s first task was to relieve
Reginald Fox, the radio officer at the British mission in Lhasa, who was to take a three
month leave.
When Ford first arrived in Lhasa, the only two radio transmitters in Tibet were
located at the British and Chinese missions. These stations were used for commercial
purposes, relaying messages for traders across Tibet, but occasionally served strategic
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purposes. During a rebellion by the monks at Sera Che, H. E. Richardson of the British
mission was asked to allow Reginald Fox to help the army with radio communications
(Goldstein 421). Tibetans strove to develop their own radio communications as part of
their push to ramp up defenses and infrastructure in the years before 1950, when
communist victory in China seemed immanent (Goldstein 620). Ford described how
since the Tibetan’s encounter with the Chinese from 1915-1917, “there was a great deal
of suspicion [and] always the fear that the Chinese might come” (Strober and Strober
103). During World War II, the Tibetan administration had allowed two American
officers passage through Tibet in search of a supply-line to China when the Burma Road
was closed. As a token of gratitude, the President of the United States gave the Tibetans
three complete radio stations. The Tibetan government asked Fox to train Tibetans to
operate the stations; after relieving Fox, Ford continued training.
In keeping with Tibet’s policy of seclusion, the administration insisted radio
stations be run by Tibetans. It quickly became apparent, however, that few Tibetans were
educated enough to become efficient radio operators. Training Tibetans was ultimately
unsuccessful and the Tibetan government reluctantly agreed to bring in outside
technicians. The first recruits were Indians, the feeling being that they were less foreign
than Europeans. Robert Ford himself then applied to the Tibetan Government for
employment (Ford 20).
To his own surprise, he was hired in 1948 and during his first year in Lhasa he
built and opened Radio Lhasa. As Tibet’s first radio broadcasting station, Radio Lhasa
allowed Tibet to broadcast to the outside world for the first time in January 1950. At first
the broadcast was only half an hour a day: the news was read in Tibetan by Rimshi Rasa
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Gyagen, in Chinese by Phuntsok Tashi Takla, the Dalai Lama’s brother-in-law, and in
English by Reginald Fox. The primary purpose of these initial broadcasts was to counter
Chinese propaganda declaring that Tibet was a part of China. The Tibetan struggle
against Chinese assertions that Tibetan and Chinese identities were inextricable was
slowly escalating, accompanied with increasing efforts towards improving military and
communications capabilities.
Before radio communications in Tibet, couriers on horseback were the swiftest
form of communication between various Tibetan provinces. To send a message from
Lhasa to Chamdo, the district headquarters in Kham, took seven to ten days by
horseback. Because Kham was the most likely starting point for Chinese aggression, it
was chosen as the site for a second radio station. Ford then set out to open Kham’s first
radio station in Chamdo, the residence of the civil and military governor-general, Lhalu
Shape. (Ford 22). Fox, who was living in India at the time, was then hired to take over
Lhasa broadcasting. A third station was established in Nagchuka, the seat of the
governor of Northern Tibet, and another possible Chinese invasion route.
Ford started his four Indian trainees on the full course he had been taught in the
R.A.F. (trainees were Indian only in nationality; they were all of Tibetan or mixed
Tibetan descent). This course included radio theory and operating technique. In order to
prevent Indians from coming to Tibet for free tuition, the trainees signed on to five year
contracts and had agreed to go anywhere in Tibet. Ford was eventually asked to expedite
their training and the trainees were sent in pairs to strategic outposts on the Tibetan
frontier.
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Figure 1: First two pages of wireless code used to relay messages.
(See appendix A for photo sources)
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In the early days of broadcasting from Chamdo, Ford communicated with Fox in
Lhasa, relaying government messages (in a code neither of them knew) and commercial
traffic published in a numerical code. After such traffic, Radio Lhasa broadcasted the
news in Tibetan, English, and then Chinese. Ford relayed the broadcast to Sikang,
Chinghai, and as much of China as his transmitter could reach. (Ford 23)
As one of the only Europeans in Tibet during the PLA’s invasion of Tibet’s
frontier in 1950, Ford was particularly distressed by the message he heard from Radio
Peking on May 22. “The tasks for the People’s Liberation Army for 1950 are to liberate
Tibet Taiwan, Hainan, and Tibet.” Ford was not especially surprised; Radio Peking had
made vague threats before and there were rumors that advance units of the PLA had
reached the Upper Yangste River area, the boundary between Chinese and Tibetan
controlled Kham (Ford 43). But Ford and the other European radio officials knew that
Chinese invaders would be on the lookout for evidence of Western imperialism and that
they would be targeted.
In July 1950, the first military contact between Tibet and China occurred at
Dengko. Ford’s trainees at the Dengko outpost sent urgent news to Chamdo through
wireless radio (Chinese forces had attacked Dengko to destroy these communications).
Robert Ford recalls the attack in his autobiography: “Sonam Phuntso [the wireless
operator in Dengko] told me he had an urgent message as soon as he came on the air. He
began to tap it out, but he did not finish. Suddenly he broke off, and telegraphed in clear:
‘The Chinese are here.’ Then there was silence. Dengko radio had closed down for
good.” One of the two radio operators managed to evade Chinese capture and arrived at
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Chamdo a week later. Sonam Phunsto informed Ford that the other operator, Sonam
Dorje, had stayed behind to tap out his final message to Chamdo. Ford immediately
reported to Lhalu, the governor general of Kham. Lhalu informed Lhasa of the attack
and asked for more wireless equipment and operators. The attack at Dengko highlighted
the importance of Tibet’s rudimentary wireless network: had there not been a station at
Dengko, no one would be aware that PLA troops were moving into Kham.
In the tense days that followed, Ford was frustrated and confused by the refusal of
Tibetan officials to radio the outside world about the attack and ask for aid:
“I was still relaying the transmissions, and I had listened to every
news-bulletin and talk that had been broadcast. I had still not heard a
single reply to Peking. No one had said that Tibet did not want to be
liberated. There had not even been a denial that Tibet was controlled by
American and British imperialists” (Ford 86).
Lhalu tried to assuage Ford and explained that Tibet didn’t want to provoke
Beijing and would resort to military action if necessary. Ford countered that if Tibet
waited until a Chinese invasion was completely underway, it would be too late to ask for
help from U.S. or U.N. forces.
Ford was even more distressed to find that Lhalu had been called back to Lhasa
and was to be replaced by Ngabö. Ngabö’s attitude differed from Lhalu’s: where Lhalu
was prepared to defend Kham militarily, Ngabö reportedly commented that Tibet could
not fight against the Chinese Communists because the Chinese had more experienced
soldiers and more advanced weaponry (Goldstein 622). Ford later admitted that the
Tibetans did have very little in the way of an army and that this army was not well
equipped or well organized (Strober and Strober 92). However, he appreciated Lhalu’s
fighting spirit and was agitated by Ngabö’s decision to remove some of the defensive
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measures Lhalu had put in place. Furthermore, of the two portable wireless sets Ngabö
had brought from Lhasa (Lhalu had repeatedly requested these after the fall of Dengko
and destruction of wireless communications there), Ngabö decided not to install either
along the border. One was to return with Lhalu to Lhasa, while Ngabö had the other
station remain in Chamdo as a spare and told Ford to keep it ready to be sent out. Ford
urged Ngabö to send the spare set to Riwoche, an important point on their escape route to
Lhasa and the village where they would ultimately be cut off by Chinese forces
advancing to the capital (Goldstein 689).1
But Ngabö refused to send out the spare radio station, and after a month of
conflicting reports regarding the Chinese position, a messenger from Riwoche arrived on
the 16th of October and reported that the Chinese were fast approaching. If Ford and
company remained in Chamdo any longer their escape route to Lhasa would be cut off.
Ngabö wired Lhasa and asked for permission to retreat (Ford contended later that Ngabö
asked Lhasa for permission to surrender to the Chinese and was denied). Hasty and
panicked preparation was made to leave immediately and it was decided that Chamdo
was to be evacuated on the eighteenth. Ford awoke on the morning of the eighteenth to
find that Ngabö and all the other Lhasa officials had left without him or his radio
operators. Ford ran to the governor’s Residency and found it completely empty. After
arranging for the destruction of his radio equipment and transport for his radio operators,
Ford set out to catch Ngabö and company.
Fleeing on horseback, he eventually overtook Ngabö at the village Lamda. There,
a messenger from Riwoche arrived to report that the Chinese attack had begun. As Ford

1

See appendix B for relevant maps.
9

and the others from Chamdo reached the foot of the Lagong pass, another messenger
reported that Riwoche had fallen. From here they would have to race Chinese forces
before they were cut off at the crossroads.

Figure 2: Tibetan Military circa 1950 Chinese Invasion
However, it soon became clear that the fleeing Tibetans could not escape the
quickly advancing Chinese soldiers. Despite Ford’s objections, Ngabö ordered his
officials and the recently arrived reinforcements to surrender and fall back to a nearby
monastery. Ford, along with others, was captured by Chinese forces. He was questioned
extensively about his activities as a British spy. Ford informed his interrogators that he
was employed by the Tibetan government and not the British government. But invading
Chinese forces needed evidence of Western imperialism, and they found Ford’s
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biography unsatisfactory. He passed from interrogator to interrogator and was eventually
imprisoned in a Chinese re-education camp. Ford underwent the rigors of communist
brainwashing, and describes in his biography his ever-changing cast of Chinese
cellmates. Radio was still a part of his routine. Loudspeakers outside one of his cells
relayed news and bulletins from Radio Chunking. Ford wrote of one occasion when he
and his cellmate Kang, a former Kuomintang officer, heard the news in Tibetan. The
broadcast was read by a woman with a good Lhasa accent. Ford was astonished to see
Kang crying after the broadcast. Ford and other prisoners were required to keep close
tabs on the activities of their cellmates:
“’Why are you crying?’ I asked; not out of sympathy or pity, but because it was
my duty to ask.
‘I was thinking of my parents,’ he said, ‘and how badly I have treated them by
supporting a corrupt reactionary regime.’
I knew that was not the truth, but it was some time later that I learnt that the
Tibetan newsreader was Kang’s wife” (Ford 225).
After five grueling years of re-education, Ford finally was released in May 1955.
He was reunited with his parents at Heathrow airport and is widely considered an
important source of information on pre-invasion era Tibetan history.

2. Transfer of Radio into Chinese hands
Chinese invaders appropriated Tibet’s nascent radio network and developed it
further. Chinese authorities established a new radio station at Phari on December 19th,
1951 as a key link in radio networking in southern Tibet. On April 11th 1952, Ford’s
Indian trainees were sent out of the country and returned to Sikkim and India (Tashi
Tsering, interview). Maintenance and operation of the six permanent radio stations and
two mobile stations fell to Chinese personnel. With the ratification of the 17 Point
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Agreement in 1959, Chinese officials in Tibet were recognized as a central power, not
merely invaders. Tibetan’s were no longer allowed a military or communications
network of their own. Slowly radio infrastructure continued expansion within Tibet
although expanding radio communications were not intended to foster connections to the
non-Communist world (in 1962, Chinese severed radio communications between the
Indian Consulate General in Lhasa and India, which had been the only radio link between
Tibet and the outside world). Tibetan radio from this point on served Chinese state
interests.

3. Shortwave Radio and Radio Jamming
In response to single-minded state media, a number of foreign broadcasters have
attempted to broadcast into Tibet and provide alternative viewpoints. Most of the radio
directed at Tibet is shortwave format. Shortwave radio (AM radio) is the chosen medium
as it is relatively easy to target a large area with one transmission. Most shortwave
broadcasting is transmitted through skywave transmissions. An antenna is used to
transmit by converting energy into an electromagnetic wave. These waves reach a layer
of the upper atmosphere called the ionosphere and are reflected downwards. The
shortwave signals spread and reach the ground hundreds or possibly thousands of miles
from the transmission site. After reaching the earth, signals will again be reflected
towards the ionosphere and bounce back to earth again, although the signal will be
weaker (Alme and Vagen 99).
It is also possible to broadcast using groundwave transmissions. With
groundwave transmission, a signal is beamed directly towards the ground. Groundwave
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signals can travel around 2-5 miles, depending on the topography surrounding the
transmission site. Shortwave radios intercept groundwave and skywave signals and
induce a voltage from them. The receiving radio then converts and amplifies the signals
back into the original sound (Alme and Vagen 100).
A discussion of foreign broadcasting into Tibet requires an understanding of the
term “jamming.” Jamming is the intentional transmission of radio signals in order to
interfere with signals from another station (Alme and Vagen 101). A transmitter tuned to
the same frequency as another transmitter can, with enough power, override the other
signal. Often, Chinese jammers simply air ordinary Chinese radio programs over
unwanted foreign transmissions (Alme and Vagen 100). As opposed to “subtle”
jamming, which cannot be heard on the receiving end, this type of jamming is referred to
as “obvious,” as it is heard by the receiver and simply drowns out the undesired
broadcast.

4. Exile Radio: VoT
Today, a number of stations exist outside of Tibet that strive to provide those in
Tibet with an alternative to state media. Voice of America, Radio Free Asia, and Voice
of Tibet have been the most successful in broadcasting into Tibet and to the Tibetan exile
community. Of these three radio stations, RFA and VoA are funded by the U.S.
government, while VoT is based in Norway. Voice of Tibet was registered as a
foundation in Oslo, Norway in 1995. VoT was founded by a number of NGOs based in
Oslo, including the Norwegian Human Rights House, the Norwegian Tibet Committee,
and Worldview Rights. With the help of donations from private individuals and the
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Norwegian Law Students Humanitarian Campaign, in 1996 VoT was able to go on air for
the first time. Three Tibetan journalists (one for each of the three main dialects, UTstang, Kham, and Amdo dialects) had been recruited and sent for training in journalism
in Dharamsala and India. VoT’s first broadcast on May 14, 1996 was a 15 minutes news
program broadcast through a transmitter site on the Seychelles islands, northeast of
Madagascar. It was rebroadcast Monday through Friday. About a month into VoT’s
broadcasting schedule, the Chinese began jamming transmissions. In response, VoT
shifted its frequency. In the early days of Chinese jamming, it took jammers around a
week to move jamming transmitters to the new frequency (today it takes seconds). In the
meantime, VoT was afforded another week of unjammed broadcasts. It was not long
before China took decisive action: on September 13, 1996, Oystein Alme, the director of
VoT, received a phone call from the Seychelles transmitter site. Chinese authorities had
informed Seychelles that all their broadcasts would be jammed unless they agreed to stop
broadcasting for Voice of Tibet. After negotiation the director of the Seychelles site
promised Alme to continue broadcasts for one month, allowing VoT time to find an
alternative transmitter site. After hundreds of phone calls and months of searching, a new
site was contracted on January 1st 1997. The new site could only offer 500 kW packages
as opposed to 100 kW VoT had been broadcasting on at Seychelles. This new deal was a
strain on VoT’s already tight budget, but after negotiating down the kilowatts and price,
VoT was able to continue broadcasts (Alme and Vagen 17).
In December 1999, VoT introduced 15 minutes of news services in Mandarin
Chinese, in keeping with the Dalai Lama’s assertion that the people of China require
unbiased news and alternative views just as Tibetans do. The new fifteen-minute service
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followed VoT’s half hour Tibetan programming. Besides reaching out to potential
Chinese listeners, the Mandarin section is also useful for listeners in Kham and Amdo
who have trouble understanding the Uke dialect used in the Tibetan broadcast. VoT has
received positive feedback from Chinese students studying in Beijing regarding their
Mandarin program. Eventually the main office was moved from Oslo to Dharamsala due
to budget concerns and also to provide reporters with better resources for reporting on
Tibetan news. At first VoT was overseen by the Department of Information and
International Relations, but the station became autonomous in 1996 to allow reporters
room for more unbiased reporting (Paldon interview).

Figure 3: VoT Insignia found on the inner wall of the VoT recording studio in Dharamsala.
Unlike VoA and RFA, VoT doesn’t cover international news, but only reports
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stories related to Tibet (one reason for this limited scope is the short length of the
program). In general, VoT’s programming follows His Holiness, developments in Tibet,
and activities in the exile community, including peace movements and protests. The
Tibetan and Mandarin sections of the broadcast are essentially the same in content. The
Tibetan broadcast includes twenty minutes of news stories, while the last ten minutes
focuses on a fixed feature for each day of the week.
VoT Feature Segments
Monday

Tibetan History

Tuesday

Music

Wednesday

His Holiness’s speeches, serialized

Thursday

Health

Friday

Diaspora concerns (may include interviews with settlement
officers or Tibetan institutions)

Saturday

His Holiness’s religious teachings

Sunday

Panel discussion and listeners forum (listeners may email in with
specific topic requests)

Reporting on events happening in Tibet proves difficult for VoT. News is
collected using a number of methods. A correspondent in Nepal meets and interviews
newly arrived Tibetans at the reception center in Kathmandu. A few people in
Dharamsala and India have contacts in Tibet and sometimes call or use the Internet to
communicate with friends or relatives for second hand information. Apart from
interviewing contacts and new arrivals, VoT reporters try to corroborate interviews with
information from other people in the area or with reports from organizations involved in
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or concerned with a particular event.
According to Tenzin Paldon, assistant director of the VoT office in Dharamsala,
jamming continues, although in the case of VoT Chinese jammers often use loud drums,
opera, and screeching noises to drown out their broadcasts. In order to counter jamming,
programs are rebroadcast 5 times a day and VoT may shift frequencies during a broadcast
(Tenzin explained that because most Tibetans use analog radios, they can simply retune
to the next frequency).
The broadcast is recorded and edited in the VoT office in Dharamsala according
to a daily routine. In the morning, VoT holds an editorial meeting. Like most modern
news followers, their main source of stories and leads is the internet, and much of the
morning is spent translating reports into Tibetan, checking the VoT server for news from

Figure 4: VoT Editor records and mixes daily broadcast. The mixer is flanked
by old analog equipment, now kept as a back-up.
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correspondents, and keeping up with daily headlines. A follow up meeting decides what
news should come first in the broadcast, what tasks should be allocated to whom, and to
organize excursions into Dharamsala or telephone interviews when necessary. Staff
members then go out into the field to record sound bytes and interviews and formulate
individual news stories. In the afternoon from 2-3 o’clock, VoT staff record their
findings. Where before, fickle analog equipment was used to produce a broadcast, VoT
recently switched entirely to digital equipment (although the old analog equipment is kept
in the recording studio out of sentimentality and in case back-up is needed). VoT boasts
a fluid personnel structure; although there are official reporters, editors, and
administrators, tasks are split evenly and everyone takes part in reporting, editing, and
translating (Paldon interview).
After determining specific slots for each news story and determining which
stories should come first (a South Indian report on a religious ceremony had top billing at
the time of the interview), the program is edited and uploaded to VoT’s server. From the
server, the broadcast is received by the transmitter sites and broadcasted into Tibet and
China. Each broadcast is also uploaded to VoT’s website and is available for download.
Listeners from outside broadcast range can download shows. Other listeners in China
can occasionally access online broadcasts
using proxy servers to bypass Chinese
Internet censors. VoT broadcasts from
several locations, although Tenzin could not
reveal the sites of transmitters. In its
Figure 5: VoT reporter in the field.

thirteen-year history, Voice of Tibet has
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constantly struggled with budget issues and steadily increasing Chinese jamming.
However, Tenzin maintains that the effort is worth the satisfaction of serving Tibet. Born
in India, Tenzin has never been to Tibet but likes to imagine her voice and her work
being transmitted throughout her mother country.

5. Exile Radio: BBG
Radio Free Asia and Voice of America are overseen by the BBG, or Broadcasting
Board of Governors. This U.S. institution was founded to oversee taxpayer-funded
broadcasting abroad. This broadcasting takes two forms: general broadcasting is carried
out by VoA and Alhurra TV and Radio Sawa and strives to provide reliable international
news and accounts of U.S. policy to areas whose governments may impede free flow of
information. The other type of broadcasting, surrogate broadcasting, includes Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty, Radio Free Asia, and Radio and TV Marti (BBG fact sheet).
These stations emphasize news pertaining to the targeted country, as opposed to
international news, that may be eschewed by indigenous media. BBG broadcasters aim
to gain the trust of people living under authoritarian governments by bypassing state
information. Rather than serve U.S. foreign relations interests by dealing directly with
foreign governments, these radio stations target the minds of the people (Kirscten).
BBG operational units include the VoA and Office of Cuba Broadcasting (which
includes Radio and TV Marti). It is headed by a bipartisan board comprised of nine
members; eight members are appointed by the president and confirmed by the senate.
The Secretary of State serves as the ninth member. Besides dispensing federal grants for
RFA and RFE/RL, the BBG’s main function is to insulate U.S. broadcasting abroad from
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politics. In 1998, during a reorganization of foreign affairs offices, lawmakers insisted
that the BBG be granted independence. Authors of the Foreign Affairs Reform and
Restructuring Act of 1998 argued that radio journalists should be shielded from the
interests of the State Department, and that broadcasting abroad should not be perceived as
simply a megaphone for U.S. policy. The BBG became an autonomous institution in
October 1999 and was authorized to make grants available to surrogate broadcasting
services. The BBG thus affords the U.S. Government with deniability, as foreign
broadcasting in authoritarian countries is usually not well received by the home
government.
U.S. surrogate broadcasting in Asia first gained momentum during the Korean
War. Later, interest resurged during the Vietnam War. This current wave of interest reemerged after the Tiananmen Square pro-democracy protests in 1989. In 1994 under the
International Broadcasting Act, Congress provided startup funds for RFA and brought all
abroad radio stations under the direction of BBG in order to avoid overlap in
broadcasting and better coordinate efforts. The bill, besides stipulating the start-up budget
of RFA, indicated that RFA would assume all obligations, not the U.S. government
(Epstein). RFA was formally founded in 1996 under the stipulations of the 1994
International Broadcasting Act.

6. Exile Radio: RFA
Radio Free Asia went on air for the first time on September 29, 1996,
broadcasting into China in Mandarin for one hour at 7 a.m. The show was rebroadcast
again at 11:00 p.m. The Chinese government reacted predictably: it sent strongly worded
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letters of opposition to top U.S. government officials
and some Chinese newspapers claimed the broadcasts
where part of a plot by the C.I.A. One year later, RFA
was broadcasting 17 hours into Asia in all the languages
mandated by Congress. Chinese opposition continued,
as Chinese officials asserted that the U.S. was using
Figure 6: Policital cartoon
from the China Daily on
January 25, 1997. RFA is
depicted as "the man with
the long tongue." The
text going into the head
reads, "rumors, twist, and
slant." Around the
microphone reads "Radio
Free Asia."

freedom of speech as an excuse to interfere in Asian
country’s internal affairs and to impose American
values on other nations. The Chinese administration
had made this complaint before in reference to foreign
broadcasting, but it now took more aggressive measures
to counter broadcasting. China began jamming all RFA

Mandarin broadcasts in most frequencies on August 18, 1997. Tibetan broadcasts were
jammed in early October 1997. RFA began broadcasting from multiple transmission
sites and on varied frequencies, which averted some jamming (Epstein). However,
Chinese efforts have kept up with broadcasting advances. Callers from Lhasa have
reported to RFA and other stations that programs are currently jammed all over the
country and especially in cities. Some report that in cities, the Chinese have constructed
up to four towers specifically for jamming foreign broadcasts, although the Chinese have
explained that these towers were installed for protection against lightening hazards (RFA
Listener Comments).
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RFA currently broadcasts in nine languages:
RFA Language Break -Down
9 Language
Services
Mandarin (Launched 9/96) 12 hours of programming per day, 7 days a week
One and one half additional hours weekly in the Wu (Shanghai) dialect.
Tibetan 3 dialects - 10 hours of programming per day, 7 days a week
Uke dialect (Launched 12/96), Kham dialect (5/97), Amdo dialect (5/97) *
Burmese (Launched 2/97) 4 hours per day, 7 days a week *
Korean (Launched 3/97) 5 hours per day to North Korea, 7 days a week
Vietnamese (Launched 2/97) 2 hours per day, 7 days a week
Laotian (Launched 8/97) 2 hours per day, 7 days a week
Khmer (Cambodian) (Launched 9/97) 2 hours per day, 7 days a week
Cantonese (Launched 5/98) 2 hours per day, 7 days a week
Uyghur (Launched 12/98) 2 hours per day, 7 days a week

The RFA Tibetan programming is recorded in the RFA stringer office in
Dharamsala. Here, reporters have access to the exile government and are better able to
cover the activities of His Holiness the Dalai Lama. The three reporters (one for each of
the three main Tibetan dialects) are paid per story and are not on salary (Dhonyoe
interview). Lobe, the reporter for the Amdo dialect, explained that this payment method
provides a strong incentive to produce a good story. The stories are recorded in the field;
reporters then return to the studio for editing. A rough cut of the story is sent to RFA
headquarters in Washington D.C. where the final cut is made. Lobe had always been
interested in reporting, and first worked in news as a translator in Delhi, where most of
the news is conducted in English. Later he moved to Dharamsala, and while working at
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Moon Peak Café established the Tibetan Social Forum which, like most small
independent newspapers, was eventually defunct due to scanty budget. But Lobe prefers
radio reporting to newspaper reporting, as it can reach a wider audience. Lobe asserted
that radio is more useful to more people, referring to the large number of ethnic Tibetans
in China who are uneducated and illiterate (Lobe interview).
When setting out to report a story, Lobe prefers not to have a plan, so as not to
impose his own idea of the story on reality. “It is best,” he said, “to just go to the site and
see what happens. There, I observe, interview, and assess what is going on.”
Interviewees are often not as aware of time limit as Lobe would like them to be; Lobe’s
slot for Amdo dialect news is short and he does not have time for the unrelated stories
and longwinded answers that often accompany his interviews. Lobe demonstrated with
his hands that he often has to dig through responses, brushing aside the extraneous, to
extract the core point of an interview. Reporting on events happening in Tibet presents
its own set of difficulties. Reporters rely on contacts with friends and relatives inside
Tibet and must extrapolate the full story from the meager information received from
inside Tibet. Phone calls over landlines are too easily tracked; RFA reporters often rely
on Internet phone services, such as Skype. Lobe even said that he had attended a seminar
held by an American man on technologies that could be used to bypass Chinese
censorship and get information out of Tibet (he shied away from discussing specific
techniques). Although difficult, the struggle for news from Tibet is imperative in order to
provide high quality reporting. “Sound bytes from Tibet are extremely important,” Lobe
insisted. “They prove that the story is real.”
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7. Exile Radio: VoA
Voice of America has long been broadcasting into foreign nations and currently
boasts programming in 53 languages on radio, TV, and internet around the world.
Ganden Tashi, a former political prisoner, is especially familiar with VoA broadcasts. As
a monk, Tashi took part in a 1989 protest, coinciding with the anniversary of March
1959’s peaceful uprising. The protest turned violent and Tashi, along with many others,
was arrested and sentenced to time in T.A.R. Prison #1. The prisoners were classified as
either criminal or political prisoners. As a political prisoner, Tashi was only allowed
state newspapers as a source of media (which Tashi was forced to pour over and
internalize). These newspapers only aggrandized the Chinese Communist party and
never mentioned Tibet or Tibetan issues.
Tashi’s isolation from the outside world eventually ended when one of his
cellmates came into possession of a shortwave radio. Political prisoners were kept
isolated. Criminal prisoners were less threatening to the Chinese administration and were
allowed more personal liberties, such as radio. Thus, a political prisoner with the right
connections could barter for radio or other contraband. Tashi recalls how occasionally,
political and criminal prisoners would interact briefly in the prison hospital, workplaces,
or the prison yard. Tashi’s radio in particular was dropped off surreptitiously in a bush
and later picked up by one of his cellmates. Prisoners had to be equally careful about
replacing batteries, which reached the prison through a web of connections through
criminal prisoners into the outside world. Because the radio had no earphones and
cellmates were constantly observed, a prison guard would have noticed immediately if
prisoners were gathered around a blaring radio. As a solution, one cellmate would turn
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on the radio very quietly and hold it up to his ear, while others kept watch around corners
using mirrors held through their prison bars. Whoever was in charge of listening had to
remember what was reported in order to pass the information onto other cellmates. These
cellmates in turn passed news along to prisoners in other cells without radio.
Hiding the radio was tricky. Prison guards routinely searched each cell with
metal detectors. One of Tashi’s large bedposts was hollowed out and used for storage.
When they got the opportunity, the inmates listened to BBC’s Chinese Problem segment
(Tashi found BBC reports were often off the mark). However, they listened mostly to
VoA’s two hours of Tibetan programming.
Before World War II, all shortwave broadcasting was in private hands. VoA
broadcasts began in January of 1942 when the U.S. government began leasing 15-minute
blocks of time on a number of private shortwave stations, calling the program the “Voice
of America.” The first Voice of America broadcast was in Germany on February 24,
1942, seventy-nine days after the United States entered World War II. “Daily at this
time, we shall speak to you about America and the war. The news may be good or bad.
We shall tell you the truth,” said the announcer. Eventually VoA was organized under the
Office of War Information. Now over sixty years later, the VoA reports to the BBG.
(VoA fact sheet). VoA programming boasts over 1,500 hours of programming in over
fifty-three languages (VoA homepage).
Tibetan broadcasting at VoA was originally the brainchild of John Buescher, a
Tibetan studies scholar at the National Endowment for the Humanities. His search for
educated Tibetans living in the U.S. with journalistic or broadcasting backgrounds and
knowledge of English was not easy. Eventually four suitable candidates were found and
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hired, including “a diamond sorter, a man who hand-sewed camera bags, a lathe operator,
and a highly educated journalist who had been working in the Office of Tibet in New
York City” (Heil 303). The fledgling crew began training in late 1990. Buescher and
executive producer Hal Swaney judged they would be ready for their first real broadcast
on March 31, 1991. However, upon discovering that the U.S. ambassador to Beijing had
a visit to Lhasa scheduled for the 31st, the VoA Tibetan staff felt that launching the
West’s first Tibetan programming that day might seem overly provocative. The
broadcast was pushed up a week. The first fifteen-minute program was broadcast on
March 25, 1991, to Brazil. Buescher recalled the moment ten years later, commenting:
“it’s a reminder that, all things aside, radio is a very human and fallible enterprise, just as,
no matter how much fancy technology you have, the broadcasts are still, and always will
be, on mind and one voice at a time in front of a microphone here connecting with one
pair of ears and one mind at a time on the high plains of Tibet” (Heil 304).
Tibetan broadcasting proceeded under Buescher, eventually joined by RFA and
VoT programming, until leadership of Tibetan services was passed to Lobsang Gyatso on
May 8, 2007 (International Campaign for Tibet). VoA is currently facing budget cuts,
including a reduction of Tibetan and English broadcasting, and a push to transfer
programming to newer media such as Internet and FM radio. Former VoA board
members have protested the $26 million in proposed cuts, arguing that the newly
appropriated funds will not be sufficient to fund transitions to newer media and that the
programs to be cut are still valuable (Francis). The proposed cuts have also sparked
protests among Tibetan activists. A contingent of Tibetan monks visited Capital Hill to
lobby for continued Tibetan broadcasting, indicating a continued appreciation for the
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broadcasts (Keil). The future of VoA Tibetan broadcasting is unsure and may not survive
VoA’s goal to incorporate new media and may eventually be pushed out by expanding
broadcast services to the Middle East. However, the programming is clearly appreciated
by those in Tibet; this appreciation necessitates continuation of some form of
communication with Tibetans in China.

8. Detractors and Proponents of U.S. Foreign Broadcasting
Foreign governments are not alone in their complaints about U.S. broadcasting
into nations perceived to have dearth of free or unbiased information. Many detractors
argue that foreign broadcasting served out its usefulness in the Cold War and that in the
new media-rich environment, competition from satellite television and radio and Internet
podcasts means that BBG surrogate stations are struggling to maintain a loyal audience
(Kaminski). Particularly in the case of China and Radio Free Asia, detractors in the U.S.
argue that China is a much more open society than Europe and the Soviet Union had been
in the 1950s when Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty was established. Some argue that
surrogate broadcasting into China is too aggressive, and that Asian governments will
react by tightening their grip on information flow and will move further away from
democratic principles (Epstein). Indeed foreign broadcasting has added to paranoia and
determination among Chinese media outlets to present only the party line. Appealing to
the citizens of a nation while alienating leadership may ultimately harm Sino-American
relations.
Other detractors assert that foreign broadcasting into China is employed as a cop
out, as economic pressure or political pressure could directly harm U.S. interests. U.S.
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foreign broadcasting has been interpreted as imposing U.S. values on the minds of
citizens while displaying reluctance to take decisive action when it comes to protecting
human rights abroad.
Jeffrey Gedmin, President of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, argues for the
continuing and increasing relevance of radio and surrogate broadcasting into regions with
oppressive governments. Regardless of motives, U.S. foreign broadcasting is more often
than not well received by citizens of authoritarian nations. Recently escaped Tibetan
refugees have reported a high degree of appreciation for foreign broadcasts. RFE/RL is
the most popular station in Afghanistan, a country in which radio is the main source of
information. Recent changes in leadership among BBG radio services have resulted in a
push to incorporate cell-phone texting and Internet, indicating that radio can keep up with
and incorporate news from new technologies (Kaminski). Shortwave radio is popular in
less-developed nations without widespread access to these new technologies and has
made successful efforts to synchronize with new media.
Relevance aside, some are ideologically opposed to interfering with foreign
countries using broadcasting charged with U.S. values and interests. Although the BBG
provides journalists with the freedom to report stories as they find fit without answering
to the State Department, it is impossible to deny the connection between BBG
broadcasting services and the U.S. government. Historically, the State Department has
exerted pressure on VoA reporters to exclude or delay certain reports that may negatively
affect U.S. foreign policy. In late September 2001, VoA aired a report containing
excerpts from an interview with Taliban leader Mullah Omar Mohammad, among other
interviews and commentaries. State Department officials pushed to have the program
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taken off the air, arguing that it gave terrorists a platform to express their views (Mullah
Omar, Interview). VoA dodged complaints in this case and has skirted other pressures in
the past by appealing to journalistic purity (Sheckler). However, the fact remains that
foreign broadcasters find themselves justifying their reporting to a U.S. government
agency, indicating a degree of responsibility to the State Department. Decisions
regarding which countries to broadcast to are strategic decisions; broadcasting is
ultimately meant to serve U.S. interests.
Gedmin responds to these criticisms by arguing for the efficacy of foreign
broadcasting from a political perspective. The Obama administration stresses “soft
power.” U.S. military officials and diplomats talk of a “political surge” to complement
the military surge in Afghanistan. Qualifying successful foreign relations no longer
emphasizes enemy body counts and military victories, but rather relationships built and
capital spent on development and reconstruction. In this new age of soft power, radio
broadcasting stands as one of the most cost-effective and well-received methods of
further U.S. foreign interests (Gedmin).
Ultimately, U.S. foreign broadcasting injects new ideas and engenders critical
thinking among societies where dialogue is discouraged. Efforts by authoritarian
governments to jam broadcasts only highlight its importance. History has shown that
when a population is given the choice, it will choose decent, accountable government and
open dialogue over suppressive government and one-sided state information. BBG
services provide an arena for the development such a society in countries where no place
for discussion exists.
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9. Question of Imposing Foreign Values on China
Foreign broadcasting has been criticized as interfering with the values of another
state. American and European broadcasters into China are seen as imposing Western
values on a nation that is economically successful and more democratic and open than the
Soviet Union had been at the outset of foreign broadcasting there. Critics argue that
foreign broadcasting into China is a waste of money: broadcasts are often effectively
jammed by Chinese authorities and a few hours of programming a day cannot compete
with China’s massive state news agency, Xinhua. Despite these and other criticisms, the
fact remains that Tibetans and Chinese in China are not afforded the basic freedoms owed
to them by the Chinese administration. These freedoms are not imagined by westerners
hung up on the power of democracy and the individual. The Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, adopted unanimously by the U.N. General Assembly in 1948, obliges
China and other nations to uphold a variety of personal rights. Article 19 propounds the
right to freedom of opinion: “Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and
expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek,
receive and impart information and ideas through any media regardless of frontiers”
(U.N. Document). Chinese state media has striven to present and impart one viewpoint:
the viewpoint of the state.

10. Conclusion
U.S. funded exile radio has an agenda. Although broadcasters are insulated, BBG
stations were still founded for strategic purposes. VoT may have less of an agenda, but is
still interfering with the state policy of another country. Broadcasting funded by another
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nation must also serve the nation footing the bill. Tibetans find themselves in the middle
of an information war with westerners working to contrast Chinese state media and win
over supporters. Each side represents a political and social ideology.
However, despite the foibles of foreign broadcasters, they are still an alternative
to decidedly single-minded state media in China. As an authoritarian government,
Chinese administration seeks not only to direct political and economic development, but
also seeks to mold the ideological state of its population to match the interests of the
state. In the case of a country as large and pluralistic as China, efforts to exact this goal
will only harm the population. In the case of Tibetans in China, not since Robert Ford
has indigenous media or radio served their interests. Citizens’ desire to seek alternative
viewpoints is stymied by the administration. If Chinese leadership will not foster a free
flow of information as it is obligated to allow, then it should come as no surprise that
others will try and fill this important niche.
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Appendix A: Photo Sources

1. Cover Photo: Harrer, Heinrich. Tibet: Zeitdokumente Aus den Jahren 19441951. Zurich: OZV Offizin, 1991.
2. Figure 1: Tibetan Wireless Code Manual. New Delhi: Sambhota Publications,
1985.
3. Figure 2: Harrer, Heinrich. Tibet: Zeitdokumente Aus den Jahren 1944-1951.
Zurich: OZV Offizin, 1991.
4. Figure 3: photo by author
5. Figure 4: photo by author
6. Figure 5: photo courtesy of Oystein Alme, director of VoT
7. Figure 6: "The Man with the Long Tongue." China Daily [Beijing] 25 Jan. 1997.
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Appendix B: Maps Pertaining to R. Ford’s Flight

Top: Ford, Robert. Captured in Tibet. New York: Oxford UP, 1990. Print.
Bottom: Shakya., Tsering. The Dragon in the Land of Snows A History of Modern
Tibet Since 1947. New York: Penguin (Non-Classics), 2000. Print.
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Appendix C: Methodology and Acknowledgements

Methodology
Because very few comprehensive studies exist on early Tibetan radio, my
discussion of Robert Ford is pieced together from Ford’s biography and various general
histories of Tibet. Likewise, little literature has been written on the logistics and history
of specific stations and programming, so these sections depended on interviews with
administrative personnel and U.S. Government documents concerned with foreign
broadcasting. Because U.S. funded broadcasting into southern Asia is controversial, both
in America and China, I depended on discussions in articles regarding the merits and
faults of U.S. broadcasting.

Acknowledgments
Producing several hours of broadcasting a day is taxing on one’s schedule.
Personnel at Radio Free Asia and Voice of Tibet were kind enough to put aside time to
discuss the ins and outs of their respective stations. They were very helpful when it came
to suggesting other contacts. Tashi Tsering of the Amnye Machen Institute likewise was
very willing to discuss my project and spared no effort in finding contacts and
photographs relevant to my paper.
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Appendix D: Suggestions for Further Research

1. Although the Tibetan programming of All India Radio is no longer especially
popular, from the 1950s until the 1980s, many top Tibetan scholars were working
or reporting for AIR. Due to time limitations, I focused on programming still
popular today, but a true history of Tibetan radio should certainly include a
discussion of AIR Tibetan programming.
2. Use of radio after the 17 Point Agreement, when China was acknowledged as a
central power in Tibet and thus Tibetans were no longer allowed independent
media, would be interesting and relevant. I focused on radio used by or directed
at Tibetans, but how Chinese occupants in Tibet used radio is grounds for further
study.
3. Current policy regarding radio in Tibet/China also deserves further attention.
Perhaps a comparison could be done between radio policy in the T.A.R. were
ostensibly a degree of autonomy is allowed and policy in other ethnically Tibetan
provinces in China.
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Appendix E: Tibetan Words and Spelling
English Transliteration

Tibetan Translation

Amdo

a mdo

Chamdo

chab mdo

Dengko

ldan khog

Dhonyoe
Ganden Tashi

dga’ ldan bkra shis

Kham

khams

Lagong

la gong

Lamda

lam mda’

Lhalu Shape

lha klu zhabs pad

Lhasa

lha sa

Lobe

blo be

Nagchuka

nag chu kha

Ngabö

nga bod

Phuntsok Tashi Takla

phun tshogs bkra shis

Rimshi Rasa Gyagen

rim bshi ra tsha rgya rgan

Riwoche

ri bo che

Sera Che

se ra byes

Sonam Dorje

bsod names rdo rje

Sonam Phunsto

bsod names phun tshogs

Tashi Tsering

bkra shis tshe ring

Tenzin Paldon

bstan ’dzin
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